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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

Addressing the city's contention that Minnesota statutes allow it to
recover costs through use, availability, or connection charges, taxes, or
special assessments, the court stated that this authority is limited. Both
the Johnsons and the court recognized that a city has the power to
collect improvement costs via availability or connection charges,
special assessments, or taxes. A municipality is not allowed, however,
to recover judicially disallowed fees through an otherwise legitimate
exercise of its authority. The court noted that "such a charge is
impermissible if it is imposed discriminatorily as a way of subverting [a
reduction or avoidance of an assessment]."
Because the "lateral benefit fee" was assessed against only those
landowners that received judicially reduced assessments, the court
determined that the fee in this case was an improper special
assessment.
The court held that "this fee constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property and is impermissible
regardless of whether the recoupment effort is under the guise of an
assessment or a connection charge." Accordingly, the Johnsons
received a refund for the amount that exceeded the previous judicial
decree.
MichaelFischer

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1998) (holding that grantor
intended to convey title of land extending to lake's shore line and that
non-riparians did not gain right-of-way to the beach outside of
delineated boundaries by a prescriptive or a deeded right-of-way).
Defendant owned riparian lots on Newfound Lake ("Lake") in
Bridgewater, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs owned non-riparian lots
with ten-foot-wide right-of-way easements for access to the Lake's
beach. The plaintiffs used the beach in front of and near the right-ofway for forty years. Beginning in the 1980s the defendants asked the
plaintiffs to restrict their use to the area inside the right-of-way's
boundaries. Because the plaintiffs refused, the defendants constructed
barriers and posted "no trespassing" signs on either side of the right of
way.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants to quiet title claiming deeded
and prescriptive rights to use the beach up to the natural high water
mark. The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' contention and ruled
that the defendants owned the beach to the high water line and owned
exclusive littoral rights to the water and lakebed. However, the court
found that the location of the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way extended
beyond the delineated boundaries; thus, the plaintiffs could traverse
additional land.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Both parties appealed the superior court ruling. The plaintiffs
challenged the court's finding that the defendants' property extended
to the high water mark. The defendants challenged the location of
the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the superior court
ruling that the defendants' property extended to the high water mark.
Because the grantor worded the defendants' deed ambiguously, the
Court used extrinsic evidence to find the grantor's intent. The
defendants introduced, and the court accepted, a letter from the
grantor's attorney that stated that the grantor intended to convey
complete title extending to the shore. Further, the supreme court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they owned the land by
prescription by finding that the defendants permitted the plaintiffs to
use the beach; thus, the plaintiffs did not satisfy prescription's adverse
element.
Additionally, the supreme court overturned the superior court
ruling concerning the location of the plaintiffs deeded right-of-way.
The supreme court found that the ruling of the lower court
contradicted the deed's plain language because it created a right-ofway that bisected the defendants' properties. Both the defendants' and
the plaintiffs' deeds dictated that the right-of-way separated the
defendants' properties.
Madoline Wallace

OHIO
Long Beach Association, Inc. v. Jones, 697 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1998)
(holding that a plat for a block containing a lagoon did not create a
separate subdivision which would prevent owners of lots in other
blocks of the subdivision from using the lagoon).
In 1923, the Long Beach Company ("Company") submitted a plat
for subdivision. It included blocks A, B, and C. The Company
subdivided only blocks A and C into lots at this time. The Company
did not subdivide Block B, situated between blocks A and C, into lots
until the Company submitted a separate plat in 1927. The 1927 plat,
entitled "Long Beach Subdivision of Block B," stated that Lot E, which
included a lagoon and private lane, "[was] for the use of lot owners
within the subdivision." The appellants purchased lots in Block B and
contended that the language in the plat dedication supported the
claim that the lagoon was for the exclusive use of the residents of
Block B. The trial court dismissed all of the appellants' claims. Upon
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the counterclaims of trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and affirmed summary judgment on the claim of

